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Back to Roy Wood Sellars: Why
His Evolutionary Naturalism Is
Still Worthwhile
P O U WE L  S L U R I N K
1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N
a t  t h e  m o m e n t , naturalism is fashionable as never before. Several of the most 
prominent living philosophers—e.g., Quine, Churchland, Ruse—call them­
selves naturalists. However, it is not always that dear what really is meant by 
naturalism, apart from a philosophy in which science plays a large role. This 
lack of clarity stems in part from the uncertainty about what is meant by 
“science”—physics, biology, or both of them. But partly it also stems from 
different interpretations of the impact of scientific models on philosophical 
reflections.
In this article I propose a return to the writings of the “evolutionary 
naturalist” Roy Wood Sellars (July 9, 1880, Seaforth, Ontario-September 5 , 
1973 , Ann Arbor, Michigan). He was the father of Wilfrid Sellars, but I think 
that the philosophy of Sellars père is a better starting-point for “a reading 
programme” for modern naturalists than the philosophy of Sellars fiIs, in spite 
of the claim of the latter that “Critical Realism and Evolutionary Natural­
ism . . . and all that they imply, are part of my paternal inheritance.” 1 Al­
though it may be true that much of the philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars is rooted 
in the philosophy of his father, we miss the illuminating evolutionary consider­
ations characteristic of his father’s philosophy in most of his work, and we can 
see a tendency to expect too much from linguistic analyses alone (instead of 
the more typically naturalistic way of expecting solutions from new perspectives 
offered by new knowledge). Beyond that, Wilfred Sellars, with his attack on “the 
Myth of the Given” and his dichotomy between the manifest and the scientific
1 “Physical Realism,” in Philosophical Perspectives (Springfield, IL: Charles Thom as, 1967 ), 185 .
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image, although in fact he was only criticizing logical positivism and extending 
some arguments of his father, probably had the effect of suggesting the hope- 
lessness of realism and naturalism .2 With his painstakingly detailed linguistic 
analyses of problems, he probably helped to initiate “the linguistic turn” in 
philosophy and thereby strengthened a movement that kept naturalism in 
check for at least one generation. Most of the time, however, his analyses are 
either completely compatible with his father’s philosophy, or try to carry it 
further in specific domains and discussions.3 Given the fact that both father 
and son tried to take “both science and man seriously,”4 the differences in 
their work can be explained partly by the completely different philosophical 
scene in which they were operating. It seems to me, however, that the elder 
Sellars was more fully alive to the importance of evolution than Wilfrid Sel­
lars. The work of Sellars pere is the best starting-point for anyone interested in 
finding a balanced and reasonable version of naturalism in which the episte- 
mological questions raised by the counterintuitive nature of physics, or by the 
mysterious relations between mind and body and mind and nature, are partly 
solved by evolutionary considerations about the nature of knowledge and 
consciousness.
In my examination of Roy Wood Sellars's philosophy I will concentrate on 
three important interrelated problems that any “adequate naturalism” will 
have to solve and for whose solution he has some very useful suggestions. 
They are, first, the problem of realism in epistemology (sections 2 and 3); 
second, the problem of “levels of organization” in ontology, which sometimes 
turn up in modern debates in the discussion about “natural kinds,” “depth 
realism”5 or about the autonomy of biology (section 4); and, third, the status 
of subjective experience in the philosophy of mind (section 5). For Roy Wood 
Sellars the solutions to these problems are closely interrelated. For him natu­
ralism meant an “interpretative synthesis” in which scientific and philosophi­
cal insights are integrated into an “organized whole” (EN, 1).6 Naturalism was
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aSee “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” and “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of 
Man,” both in Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963).
s See, e.gM “The Identity Approach to the Mind-Body Problem” in Philosophical Perspectives, 
and also his very illuminating article, “The Double-Knowledge Approach to the Mind-Body 
Problem,” New Scholasticism XLV (19 7 1 ): 269—89, on his father’s philosophy of mind.
4 Gary Gutting, “Philosophy of S c ie n c e in  C. F. Delaney et al., The Synoptic Vision: Essays on the 
Philosophy o f Wilfrid Sellars (Notre Dame Be London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977).
sSee A. Collier» Critical Realism: A n Introduction to Roy Bhaskar’s Philosophy (London: Verso,
1994)-
6 The following abbreviations are used in this essay: CR: Critical Realism (New York: Russell 8c 
Russell, 1916); EN: Evolutionary Naturalism (London Be Chicago: Open Court, 1922); PPR: The 
Philosophy o f Physical Realism (New York; Russell & Russell, 1966 [1932]); RAPW: Reflections on 
American Philosophy from Within (Notre Dame/London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969); 
PPPP: The Principles, Perspectives and Problems of Philosophy; An Exploration in Depth (New York:
in his opinion essentially an opportunity to build a systematic philosophy on a 
solid foundation in which all problems are treated on the basis of the same 
general principles.
What makes Roy Wood Sellars so special is not only that his thinking is 
evolutionary, but that his underlying view o f evolution is completely different 
from the views of contemporary fellow “evolutionary” philosophers like Berg­
son, Samuel Alexander and Lloyd Morgan. Although Sellars did not write 
much about evolutionary biology* and most of his writings come from a period 
well before the era of the revival of Darwinism, it is clear from his writings on 
materialism that there is nothing mystical about his notion of emergence and 
that there is not a remnant of vitalism in his views. In his later work he was 
able to integrate modern discoveries about genes into his conceptual frame­
work without any difficulty (see, e.g., PPPP, 270). His conclusions from evolu­
tionary theory often anticipate later evolutionary epistemology with its hypo­
thetical realism. Modern discussions about the mind-body problem are also 
foreshadowed in his evolutionary approach to this subject.
In all these discussions Sellars’s subtlety and clarity makes his work, even 
now, worth studying. Here is a philosopher who continually refers to the 
classical philosophers but who also knows his physics and biology; a philoso­
pher who was prepared to enter into discussion with all of his contemporaries, 
not only pragmatists, new realists, logical positivists, and ordinary language 
philosophers, but also idealists, Thomists, dialectical materialists, humanists, 
existentialists. Besides that, in Sellars we meet a philosopher who was always 
prepared to go back to his most fundamental presuppositions while at the 
same time retaining an intuitive feel for the underlying presuppositions be­
hind other philosophical stances. But let us start with the problem of realism.
2 .  K N O W L E D G E  AS AN E V O L U T I O N A R Y  A C H I E V E M E N T  A N D  T H E
N E C E S S I T Y  OF A R E A L I S T I C  F R A M E W O R K
Today the discussion about realism in the philosophy of science is largely 
concerned with the opposition of scientific realism (which upholds the “real” 
reference of theoretical terms) and instrumentalism. In the days of Sellars the 
opposition was more that of realism and idealism. Yet these discussions show 
important continuities, since antirealistic attitudes are still largely based on 
empiricistic and phenomenalistic arguments. The underlying question in both
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Pageant Press International Corp, 1970); PER: W. P. Warren, ed., Principles of Emergent Realism: 
Philosophical Essays by Roy Wood Sellars (St. Louis, MO: Warren H. Green, 1970); NA: W. P. 
Warren, ed., Neglected Alternatives: Critical Essays by Roy Wood Sellars (Lewisburg, 1973). For an 
introduction to R. W. Sellars, see for example C. F. Delaney, M ind and Nature: A Study o f the 
Naturalistic Philosophy o f Cohen, Waodbridge and Sellars (Notre Dame & London; University o f Notre 
Dame Press, 1969).
debates is therefore still, “What is our justification in inferring an unobservable 
reality x from a set of observations?” or “What is our justification in inferring a 
thing-in-itself behind the phenomena?”
Therefore when Bas van Fraassen speaks about “saving the phenomena,” 
he no longer seems to be concerning himself with Humean sense-impressions; 
nevertheless, he relies heavily on the distinction between the certainty at­
tached to what we humans can observe and the sphere of scientific speculation
1
and explanation “beyond.” Van Fraassen is a student of Wilfrid Sellars, who, 
as we have seen, stressed the distinction between the “manifest image” and the 
“scientific image” and who related the latter to unobservables. But while Wil­
frid Sellars speculated about the possible replacement of the manifest image 
(though he was not so radical as Paul Churchland, another student of his), van 
Fraassen interprets the scientific image as the realm of speculation and makes 
a fundamental distinction between (realistic) “belief in” and merely (instru- 
mentalistic) “acceptance of” a theory postulating unobservables.? When Ar­
thur Fine pleads for a “minimalist” philosophy of science, he does so because 
he doesn’t believe in “adding” an “external world” to our scientific beliefs.8 
And when the self-confessed naturalist Michael Ruse claims that “Darwinian 
epistemology” really combines better with Humean “metaphysical scepticism” 
than with Kantian “metaphysical realism,” the underlying paradigm is still the 
Humean stream of impressions and the “thing-in-itself” “beyond” those im­
pressions. His claim is that between these two realms there exists only “a 
justificatory void.”9
It seems to me that in all these views, even Ruse’s, Darwinism is not taken 
seriously enough. If the Darwinian explanation of life and knowledge is taken 
seriously, a mind-independent reality which can be partially known has to 
exist, because we are immersed in a struggle for existence in this reality and 
our minds have evolved to orient us and direct our behavior. Of course, there 
is no ultimate proof of Darwinism nor of the hypothetical realism that it 
includes, but the point is that realism is simply part of the Darwinian paradigm and 
is not a metaphysical “e x t r a as suggested by Ruse. There has to be a reality 
outside the organism if the concept of adaptation is to make any sense, and the 
capacity for knowledge and even for science enables certain organisms to 
adapt themselves to their cosmic environment. Cognition as adaptive represen­
tation is only one form of adaptation, but the simple fact that brains exist
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7See B. van Fraassen, “To Save the Phenomena,” Joiima/ of Philosophy 73 (1976): 625—32; The 
Scientific Image (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980),
8See A. Fine, “The Natural Ontological Attitude,” in J. Leplin, ed., Scientific Realism (Berke­
ley: University of California Press, 1984).
9See M. Ruse, Taking Darwin Seriously: A Naturalistic Approach to Philosophy (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1986), 192.
shows that somehow orientation on the basis of clues from the environment 
which are processed into a central decision-center works (EN, 72- 73).10 And 
there has to be at least a minimal correspondence, or fitting, between ideas 
and world if it is to work. Because both adaptation and adaptive representa­
tion presuppose an outside world, it would be highly artificial to believe in or 
accept Darwinism and at the same time try to be a complete sceptic. Metaphysi­
cal realism is simply part of the Darwinian framework.11
Of course, according to the Darwinian interpretation our brains have 
evolved to detect the everyday world around us (the mesocosmos).12 A Darwin­
ian framework warns us not to trust our imagination if we want to go beyond 
that sphere, but it does not exclude the possibility that instruments and our 
inferential reasoning could enable us to stretch the sphere of the knowable far 
beyond the everyday world. The point here is that the borderline between 
classical “metaphysical” realism and modern “scientific” realism about scien­
tific entities is not that sharp, given our evolved abilities to combine different 
sources of information into a representation that to some extent maps the 
world around us.1^  Of course, the realism that is a part of Darwinism is only a 
hypothesis explaining, first, how a world without us could turn into the world 
around us and, second, how the world around us is reflected and registered in 
our brains in a way that enables us to behave adequately.
It is this “hypothetical realism” that is not only foreshadowed in the work 
of Sellars, but which is also described there in detail. Sellars does not so much 
give reasons for believing in realism generally, as he tries to show that cogni­
tive claims simply are claims about supposedly real objects or properties, and 
that an evolutionary analysis of cognition simply has to assume realism from 
the very start. He is aware of the distinction between the sphere of “common- 
sense realism” and the sphere of scientific speculation, which his son Wilfrid 
stressed (and perhaps exaggerated) and on which van Fraassen seems to rely. 
But he sees no reason to favor the first (which he calls “naive realism”) over 
the second, or vice versa, because he thinks we don’t “intuit” reality directly in 
either of them (nothing is “given”), He also recognizes the uncertainty in-
BACK T O  R OY  W O O D  S E L L A R S  4 2 9
10 O f  course, this is not a “p ro o f’ of realism, because in principle our brain could be adapted 
to a world that no longer exists. T he brain as an organ of orientation could have evolved because 
the world until last Friday was causal, stereometric, and homogenic: since last Friday, however, all 
our causal and space/time-related expectations are simply atavistic illusions. T he point is that we 
don't have much reason to believe such a hypothesis.
11 See R. G. Meyers, “Evolution as a Ground for Realism,” in N. Reseller, ed., Evolution, 
Cognition, and Realism: Studies in Evolutionary Epistemology (New York: University Press of America,
l 99°)-
12 See G. Vollmer, Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie (München: Hirzel, 1975).
is It is no coincidence that Sellars was one of the first to use the term  ‘scientific realism’; see his
CR.
volved in all cognition, but sees no ground in it for an epistemological ideology 
inspired by caution only, such as Ruse’s “metaphysical scepticism,” which de­
nies the possibility of real though uncertain progress in the development of 
ever better theories and interpretations.
Realism for Sellars is therefore simply a part of his paradigm or, to use the 
term he himself uses, his framework. For Sellars an approach in which meta­
physical realism is something that has to be proven is already determined by a 
series of false assumptions. Large parts of his work are devoted to analyses of 
the historical roots of these assumptions which place the burden of proof on 
the realist, and to the way in which they can be replaced by a model that is 
more in harmony with both common sense and science. Let us first present his 
analysis and then try to imagine what kind of position they would lead him to 
in more recent debates.
Sellars traces the assumptions which have driven realism into a blind alley 
back to Descartes, Locke, and Hume. In his article in Mind} “Sensations as 
Guides to Perceiving,” he locates the most fatal presupposition in what he calls 
Locke’s causal theory of perception, according to which the awareness of sense- 
data as atomic facts causes us to "infer” objects. Starting from this presupposi­
tion our actual, perceptual beliefs are without any justification, and even our 
common-sense realism totters. Opposed to the “inferential realism” that tries 
to prove that there are objects “behind” the phenomena, Sellars places the 
“referential realism” of the new realists as well as the critical realists, both of 
whom see perception as from the very start objectively referring to objects. 
The difference between the new and the critical realists lies in the naive 
behaviorism and pan-objectivism of the new realists, which contrasts with the 
refined representationalism of the critical realists (to which he himself be­
longed: he even created the name; see NA, 362). Sellars’s own contribution is 
a thorough analysis of knowledge as an “evolutionary achievement”—as an 
evolved solution to the problem of the necessity of orientation.
So the best cure for empiricism and phenomenalism is simply a more 
scientific model of perception in which “the stimulus aspect is just the begin­
ning of true perception” (PER, 122) and in which true perception has to be 
understood as guiding the behavior of the organism. Sense-data are from the 
beginning only used as cues in a “perceptual judging” (PER, 65) and are there­
fore not “terminal.” Sensory factors are used as guides and are therefore more 
occasions than causes of knowledge. Stimuli and response are mediated by 
“central aroused processes” which enable the organism to do something with 
the incoming stimuli, for example to learn from them (PER, 10). Stimuli alone 
have no importance or meaning whatsoever. What is important is the way in 
which we represent the world as a result of both stimuli and the structure of 
our nervous system.
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The introduction of a representationalism that no longer splits the world 
into two is a major concern of Sellars’s epistemology. In his article “ ‘T rue7 as 
Contextually Implying Correspondence” he tries to show that the rickety na­
ture of the first versions of representationalism were the main cause of episte- 
mology’s historical detour. Locke created a problem by interpreting ideas as 
the primary objects of knowledge and then suggesting that ideas might “copy” 
a real world. Against this Sellars proposes that there is a difference between 
the content and the object of knowledge: knowledge is directed toward (real, 
external) objects but, since there is no way in which objects can be directly 
given, it uses perceptions as clues and continually constructs and reconstructs 
representations of the objects. In sum: “We look through the visual field at the 
things stimulating us and apply learned concepts to them under the guidance of 
the visual field” (PER, 20).
So ideas are taken as mediating between the knower and the known, and 
with that directness and mediation are no longer contradictory (PER, 113).14 
We only have access to things via ideas and ideas are not essences of things, but 
“learned concepts.” Sellars is critical of the “doctrine of essence” of some of his 
fellow critical realists, like Drake and Santayana. He clearly commits himself to 
nominalism. O f course, reality has “structure and connections” and exhibits 
“persistent patterns” (PPR, 163), but those are not directly given to the mind. 
Instead, the mind has to learn to discriminate them and to label them accord­
ing to its own categories. The repetition of the act of adequately recognizing 
and labeling them is “quite analogous to the repetition of a skilled act” (PPR, 
164). In  even more complex acts symbols are used as characterizations of 
complex patterns.
We can interpret modern connectionism as support for this analysis of 
knowledge. According to the connectionist analysis a neural network which is 
learning some distinction is “fed” a large sample of characteristic patterns of 
stimuli which results in specific divisions of synaptic weights corresponding 
with those patterns.16 Those specific divisions of synaptic weights represent a
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l*This is a point that recurs in the philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars: “Whereas the naive realist 
wants to construe our knowledge of the physical world as direct and unmediated, and the repre- 
sentationalist construes it as mediated and indirect, Sellars is trying to fashion a middle course 
that sees our knowledge o f the physical world as direct but mediated. Perceptual knowledge 
properly so called will be mediated by sensations but will not be directly about sensations” (C.F. 
Delaney, "Theory o f Knowledge" in The Synoptic Vision, 5).
^See especially PPR, vi, 155- 83: "I am a conceptual nominalist who regards concepts as 
arising in individual minds and having the capacity of disclosure o f the characteristics o f objects, a 
capacity well founded on the basis of sense-data. And I am an ontological nominalist who rejects 
the universal-theory.”
lG See P. Churchland, A Neurocoviputational Perspective (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
1989); henceforth referred to as ANP.
kind of “prototype” that enables the neural network to classify new patterns of 
stimuli in the right categories. Sellars’s “learned concepts” could correspond 
to those “prototypes in a trained network” in that they both, first, are based on 
real distinctive patterns coming from “outside” the neural system and, second, 
are “translated” into something within the mind. Sellars’s model is more “eco­
logical and teleological,” however, than Churchland’s version of connec- 
tionism, because there is no dogma of infinite plasticity here and the mind is 
portrayed as actively deciphering its environment as a function of the need for 
orientation (we shall note other differences in section 5).
Central to Sellars’s analysis is the notion that all complex mental operations 
with representations and concepts refer to real objects. “I think through the 
distinguishable content of the idea to the denoted object” (PPR, 164). The 
concepts with which the mind thinks things are, of course, not identical with 
anything in the thing, but are able to disclose its characteristics (PPR, 166).
Of course, the background of this analysis is the idea that knowledge arose 
to adapt the mind of the individual organism to its environment (EN, 340). 
The organism of course has no direct access to the world, but is in need of at 
least a kind of internal map corresponding with the real world to which it must 
adapt (EN, 72—73). All of Sellars’s analyses of classical philosophical mistakes 
are thus inspired by his evolutionary approach to cognition, from which his 
representationalism follows directly. In this respect he is really a philosophi­
cally very sophisticated precursor of modern evolutionary epistemology and 
modern ecological as well as naturalistic-teleological analyses of knowledge.1?
The two most important characteristics of knowledge are, then, (1) “transla­
tion in another medium” (physical characteristics of objects are translated into 
categories, ideas, etc.) and (2) what Sellars calls “aboutness” (PER, 22) and 
what under the influence of Brentano and Husserl is often called “inten­
tionally.” Because Sellars emphasizes both these aspects of knowledge, his 
critical realism is both critical and realistic, His consequent evolutionary natu­
ralism is expressed by the fact that he explains both characteristics as results of 
the specific set-up of our brain-mind.
(1) With regard to “translation in another medium”: Time and time again 
Sellars stresses the fundamental difference between cognitional identity and 
existential identity. In cognitional identity characteristics of objects are grasped 
in terms of predicates within the act of cognition (PER, 125). Cognitional 
identity is therefore not identity in the strict sense (and maybe Sellars 
shouldn’t have used the concept of identity at all) but rather reflection, projec-
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*7 See, e.g., Vollmer, Evolutionäre Erkenntnislehre; R. Millikan, White Queen Psychology and, Other 
Essays for Alice (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1994); D. Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1993).
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tion, or correspondence: it is no coincidence that more often he speaks of 
translation, reproduction, or transferral to another medium. Some citations 
may give an impression of the way in which he searches for analogies:
The fundamental postulate of critical realism is . . .  that patterned and correlated 
sense-data can mediate just the kind of knowledge of the physical world we actually 
possess according to science. . . . The content of perception contains a translation of the 
gross structure of the external world, and theory pushes this translation further. , . . 
But never do we intuit the very stuff of the physical world. . . .  It is the form of 
reality . . . not reality itself which is grasped by the human mind. (PER, 1 1 1 )
The revelatory identity between content of knowledge and the object of knowledge 
concerns the characteristics of things. It is this that is reproducible in another medium. 
Things must have structure and connections. In knowledge, our universals are con­
tents which partly symbolize, partly reproduce this structure and these connections. 
The content of knowledge is, as it were, a translation of the characteristics of the thing; 
and, as in all translations, there is reproduction and yet difference. . . . Knowledge can 
never be anything bu t a pale reflection of the object. Knowledge should not claim to be 
being. (EN, 37)
The need of the organism is to achieve a presentational pattern corresponding to 
the physical environment to which it must adapt itself. , . . The facts indicate that the 
organism selectively receives stimuli in their real order and transmutes them into 
sense-data of a corresponding order. , . . The brain is sympathetic with reality, and, 
like a skilled lawyer, draws out its story and puts it into its own language. (EN, 72—73)
The obvious conclusion from all these citations is that our brain “has its 
own language” into which it maps its environment,18 This “language” is 
largely a product of the organism’s evolved mindset. Eventually its representa­
tions or reconstructions have only to guide the organism in its environment; 
they only have to be uberlebungsadaquat (Vollmer). This means, however, that 
they have to be continually updated and corrected. How is this achieved?
(2) It is here that “aboutness” or intentionality becomes important. It is 
especially in his later work that Sellars discovers that the brain-mind is able to 
guide the organism as a result of the “from-and-to-circuit” or “circuit of re­
tu rn /’ in which the acting organism, via its sense-organs, corrects its represen­
tations o f the world. There is a “give-and-take” (PER, 24) of our muscular 
interplay with the things around us, which has both “direction and objective 
import” because it has to guide our behavior. The “referential transcendence” 
of our representations is thus based on the particular structure of our 
knowledge-apparatus, the deliverances of which we naturally take as an inter­
active perspective on the world. We are able to isolate objects and zoom in on 
them, as it were. In doing so we use subjective sense-data via an act of percep­
tual judging in an objectively referring way (PER, 65). Our knowledge can
18 See D. Bickerton, Language and Species (Chicago 8c London, 1990), for a description of the 
way in which each medium dictates the way events are being represented in it.
thus be subjective in content while having at the same time an objective frame­
work of reference which causes it to be continually corrected and updated.
It was the mistake of Kantian idealism to forget this. Kant took the phenome­
nal world as our normal everyday world. The thing-in-itself could thus be seen 
as unknown. In cognition, however, we are continually directed to the world-in- 
itself via the phenomena. The phenomenon is the thing-in-itself as we are 
compelled to think it (PER, 83). The phenomenal world is therefore the world 
of representations and reconstructions we create as a result of our interaction 
with the real world, which is guided by our intentionality, the natural “focus” of 
our minds. Although, of course, knowledge is always uncertain, we can achieve 
knowledge of the real world through our phenomenal world and the way it 
changes as a result of our activities and the way in which we move from perspec­
tive to perspective. The phenomenal world is therefore our interactive perspec­
tive on the real world. ^  “I can transcend my consciousness, not in the sense that 
I can get outside of it in any literal way, but in the sense that the knowledge I 
build up in it can by an act in consciousness be thought of as interpretative of an 
existent affirmed by the self as co-real” (EN, 45).
This, in combination with our knowledge of Sellars’s comments on Kant 
(e.g., in EN), probably gives us also an indication about the kind of answer 
Sellars would have given to Husserl’s idealism, Probably he would have com­
mented that it is not possible to have intentionality without realism. In opposi­
tion to Husserl’s proposal to put all reality claims “between brackets” (the 
“epoche”) we could argue from the view-point of a Sellarsian critical realism 
that intentionality only makes sense in interaction with a real world, although of 
course we can never intuit such a world directly.
Knowledge, then, is both subjective in content and objective in reference— 
and as a result of the gap between those poles it is always characterized by 
uncertainty. “Knowledge is a saltatory claim, though to its making you may 
have any number of ambulatory experiences” (EN, 36). To know is to gamble, 
to some extent, but of course, there are strategies for minimizing risks, and 
science is one of them.
According to Sellars only an epistemology that has gone through a phase 
of idealism can depict these phenomena correctly.20 There is therefore a 
fundamental difference between critical realism and common sense realism. 
An important part of critical realism is the explanation of naive realism. In 
opposition to many versions of idealism and antirealism, Sellars never forgot
A contemporary of Roy Wood Sellars who found a similar answer to Nietzsche’s relativistic 
perspectivism in a realistic perspectivism was José Ortega y Gasset. See his El tema de nuestro tiempo 
(Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1923), in which he proves that perspectivism is not only compatible with 
realism, but actually presupposes it
30 See especially Chapter 2 of PPR, “Idealism as an Interlude.”
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that the explanation of the beliefs of philosophical antipodes is one of the 
tasks o f a philosophical theory. As a result of this, both (a) our naive ob­
jectification of the way in which we perceive things and (b) our naive ob­
jectification of concepts (naive logical realism; PPR, 166) have to be explained.
(a) O ur “natural objectification of the object of perception” (EN, 25) is a 
result of our “natural instincts and motor attitudes.” They cause the “natural 
illusion”21 that the objects we perceive are literally presented. Although Sellars 
doesn’t make this explicit, the cause of naive realism is therefore the relative 
superfluity of a more sophisticated epistemology for an acting organism. The 
acting organism needs a representation of the world which it is not able to 
interpret lightheartedly as merely a stream of sensory chimeras.
Sellars seems to underestimate the role of genetic factors in this natural 
objectification (although not as radically as Churchland). At least, he is not 
very clear about what he means by “instincts” and “natural motor attitudes.” 
He sees categories as “growths” (EN, 71)22 and sees the notion of a thing as 
something that “develops in the setting of perceptual attitude, response and 
result” (PER, 12). Modern evolutionary epistemology is in this respect clearer, 
although it may sometimes overestimate the genetic influence or forget that 
the genetic influence is already a product of an atavistic cognitive interac­
t i o n . W h e n  we need an interactive theory in embryology, there is every 
reason to assume that we need it in epistemology as well.
(b) Part of our “natural ontological attitude” is our naive logical realism, 
that is, our tendency “to project into the things the meanings in terms of which 
we think of them.” Instead of “thinking of predicates as disclosing objects” the 
naive logician is inclined to think of them “as being one with the characteristics 
of the objects” (PPR, 166). Of course, this tendency is also exactly what we 
would expect of a creature who doesn’t need epistemological sophistication in 
the first place.
A possible cause of many problems in epistemology is simply the sheer 
disbelief in the miracle of knowledge as an “evolutionary achievement” (PER, 
118). The contrast between the complexity of the knowledge-apparatus and the 
natural simplicity and spontaneity of the knowledge-act is difficult to grasp. On 
the one hand idealists and others are inclined to see knowledge as something 
“beyond biology”; on the other hand some naturalists (for example, Dewey) are
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82 He adds “and yet, I think, they are inevitable growths.”
a3 European evolutionary epistemology from Lorenz to Vollmer tends to regard the Kantian 
"a priori” as a set o f  evolved interpretative frameworks. Hence, it proclaims that what is 
ontogenetically a priori can be phylogenetically a posteriori. In reaction to the supposedly naive 
realism involved, Michael Ruse rejects this form o f  evolutionary inductivism and stresses almost 
exclusively a kind of evolutionary relativism (see his Taking Darwin Seriously).
inclined to underestimate the problems of adequate representation of an out­
side world, which leads them to downplay epistemological problems.
Sellars was always consistent in treating knowledge as a biological achieve­
ment for which there is simply no analogy. The revelatory identity of content 
of knowledge and the characteristics of the object of knowledge is the product 
of the necessity for the organism of finding clues to orient itself (PER, 115 ; 
EN, 72—73 , 340).24 Knowledge is thus anything but a biological luxury, and 
only that explains its spontaneity and (apparent) adequacy. Therefore, when 
many epistemologues (for example, the new realists and the idealists) underes­
timate the complexity of the knowledge-act, they are like spectators who think 
that the ballet-dancers are simply born graceful. To understand knowledge, 
however, one needs to understand why organisms need a picture of their 
environment, why they use different kinds of vibration and radiation to con­
struct such a picture, and why they conceive their picture of reality as Reality 
itself. Above that, one needs to understand the cumulative effects of time and 
chance over innumerable generations. Our knowledge-apparatus is simply an 
amazing product of evolution. One doesn’t need to travel far to experience 
one of the greatest of natural wonders.
It seems to me that Sellars understood this. According to him, knowledge 
only appears simple. “It is an evolutionary achievement involving a complex 
mechanism” (PER, 118).
3 . S E L L A R S ’S R E A L IS M  A N D  T H E  C O N T E M P O R A R Y  D E B A T E
In what sense do these analyses contribute, then, to the realist/instrumentalist 
discussion in the philosophy of science? I think they show us at least three 
things.
1 . First, the distinction between observable and unobservable realities 
(between common sense and science) is a very gradual one. What we accept 
as observables are already brain-made interpretations. Our common-sense 
beliefs about the world are simply interpretations that fit in so well with our 
“motor attitudes” and that are used and confirmed by use so continually, 
that we are simply no longer able to have serious doubts about them. In 
principle, the borderline of cases in which we have such “stable interpreta­
tions” of our environment can be stretched out far beyond the sphere of 
ordinary life. This I take to be also the message of Hacking’s article on
“Experimentation and Scientific Realism.”2s When a scientist routinely ma-
i
*4 See, for example: “The activities of the mind are like ingenious tools, they further the aim 
of the organism ’1 (EN, 73). “The brain-mind is an organ whose function is the adjustment of the 
individuar5 (EN, 340).
I. Hacking, “Experimentation and Scientific Realism,” Philosophical Topics 13 (1982): 7 1 - 87.
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nipulates unobservable entities like electrons in an experimental setting, he is 
familiar with them in the way normal people are familiar with chairs and 
electric drills. O f course, it is always possible that what we have conceived as 
an electric drill will be discovered to be a new species of death-watch beetle, 
but at least there is a "consistent syndrome of related symptoms” that is 
somewhere out there.
Both in everyday life and in science there is therefore a gradual transition 
from stable to more unstable interpretations, the latter of which are the result 
of a shorter period and a more indirect way of interaction. Both in everyday 
life and in science interpretations are corrected continually in the “from-and- 
to circuit” discovered by Sellars in his later years. Often fundamental “Gestalt- 
switches” (in science we might rather speak of Kuhnian changes of paradigm) 
are the result of a more intimate familiarity with the objects on which we focus 
our attention.
But there is no clear line between the observable and the unobservable, 
because we do not see sense-data. Essentially we always see something we con- 
struct out o f stimuli.26 Sellars tries to express this by stating that we see through 
the stimuli, while denying that it is possible that the object is literally pre­
sented. T hat means that our minds continually create a world out of our 
stimuli that seems to correspond roughly with the real world in that it at least 
seems to be a consistent fantasy in which we don’t die too often in a car 
accident. In  our everyday lives we are well enough acquainted with relatively 
small misinterpretations that we are able to live through our big dream with­
out too much epistemological anxiety. But in science the things that we “see” 
through our stimuli are so amazing, and our Gestalt-switches succeed each 
other with such rapidity, that we can be seduced by antirealistic philosophers 
into a nostalgic preference for the realism of everyday life.
In spite of assertions to the contrary,^ however, a rather consistent 
“fantasy-world” seems to arise from the research of science. When we concen­
trate on the fate of individual hypotheses, of course, we see them come and go 
like the scientists who propose them. But on the whole our world-view has 
changed dramatically since the Renaissance and it is very difficult to deny that 
this change can be described as an “increase of knowledge.” For example, at 
the moment it is probably still unclear exactly what the role of change and 
selection in evolution is, but compared with debates in the nineteenth century, 
when the very fact of evolution was denied, on the whole modern debates
86 T h is point is, o f  course, stressed by most m odern authors, including', e.g., James Gibson in 
The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Boston: H oughton Mifflin, 1979).
Especially by L. Laudan in “A Confutation o f  Convergent Realism,” Philosophy o f Science 48 
(1981): 19 - 48 .
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about evolution can be described as “fine-tuning.” What a century ago was still 
pure speculation (for example, evolution among the hominids), we are now 
actually able to “see” through a series of fossils. At the moment, there are 
about a hundred-fifty studies about evolutionary processes in the wild (for 
example, about Darwin finches on the Galapagos), a fact which for Darwin 
and his contemporaries was only a dream. And, as I said before, I don’t see 
how it is possible to combine Darwinism with antirealism.
By patient observation and experimentation scientists are thus often able to 
throw light on processes that would otherwise go unnoticed. Science can there­
fore be described as the undertaking of enlarging the scope of our experience 
in particular domains by a series of specially designed methods. But that leads 
us to conclude that science itself is the undertaking of enlarging the realm of the 
observable. Science means extending our natural sensory equipment in such a 
way that we can transcend the limits that are normally imposed upon it. Science
4
is therefore in essence a cultural/technological expanding of the scope of com­
mon sense. This means, however, that any attempt to link up realism with the 
kind of everyday reality we cherish in the late twentieth century is premature. 
What today is unobservable, can be observable tomorrow. When we think of 
concepts like chromosomes, black holes, Archeopteryx, the cosmic particles we 
can “see” in a bubble chamber, Homo erectus, etc., we see the borders of the 
observable gradually broadening. No doubt there are still many unobservable 
entities waiting to be discovered tomorrow. Does that mean that they don’t exist 
today?
2. Closely related to this fluid border between the unobservable and the 
observable is the problem of representation. Because it is true that nothing is 
literally observable, in the sense that everything we see is constructed out of 
sense-data, our total world is a product of the way we “conceptualize” it. This 
conceptualization does not need to be a matter of language, as Churchland 
shows in his connectionist interpretation of knowledge. As I have already 
indicated, I think that connectionist “prototypes” are about the same as what 
Sellars meant when he spoke of “concepts.” Sellars concentrated, however, 
more on the ecological context in which the brain-mind converts physical 
characteristics of things into corresponding representations. As a result of this 
Sellars was able to call himself “a conceptual nominalist who regards concepts 
as arising in individual minds and having the capacity of disclosure of the 
characteristics of objects, a capacity well founded on the basis of sense-data” 
(PPR, vi).
This means that concepts in the sciences are also ways in which the brains 
of scientists, using all kinds of techniques to enlarge the scope of their interac­
tion with the world and with particular phenomena in it, structure a real 
world. O f course, particular concepts or distinctions may appear only tempo-
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rarily, to be replaced later by more adequate divisions and concepts.28 The 
essential point, however, is that we see the world through a veil of representa­
tions and that we are continually interacting with real phenomena to “dis­
close” their real characteristics. We are continually trying out different transla­
tions, as it were, and in this process of “matching” and “puzzle-solving” we 
gradually learn more about the world with which we are interacting, Sellars’s 
“circuit o f return” is truly an enlightening concept in this case.
But, as we also can learn from Sellars, we never intuit the real world 
without something in between us and it. Knowledge, in essence, is interaction 
with the world via representations/concepts/prototypes in such a manner that 
we can orient ourselves. It is never a literal “givenness” of essences, objects, or 
sense-data in the mind. (As we have seen, this point was elaborated especially 
by Sellars fils,) Both common-sense knowledge and scientific knowledge are 
therefore essentially reconstructive, representational, and interactive (another 
point made by Sellars ft  Is, but taken in a somewhat different direction). Both 
can only be reconstructive, representational, and interactive, however, in rela­
tion with a real world and real objects. The idea that scientific concepts are 
different because they are only “instruments” is to deny this element of real 
interaction with the world in which scientific concepts are used to “disclose” 
characteristics of things. It is also to look in a very one-sided manner at a 
relatively small series of situations in which scientists decide to go on with a 
particular model without caring why it works. O f course, many working scien­
tists, especially specialists who concentrate on a relatively small group of phe­
nomena, can afford the luxury of looking at their models this way. But when 
we look at the scientific enterprise as a whole, the instrumentalistic attitude is 
seen rather as an exception that proves the rule—the rule being that science 
“discloses/5 “discovers,” phenomena, causes, and relationships that were hid­
den before. The aim of science in general is the development of a series of 
representations/concepts/prototypes that give us access to the real world and 
that enable us to deal with it. Only when we look at science in this way are we 
able to see how it grew out of common sense.
3 . T he third and most important point that we can learn from Sellars is, 
then, that realism is not a metaphysical “extra” theory that has to be added each 
time that a model seems to work. Realism is not an explanation of the success 
of science, because this would imply that it is an extra addition. Realism is 
simply the intention and direction of science in general, and of most theories 
in particular. It is especially the intention of the Darwinian theory of evolu-
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neural networks sometimes can’t get to the global conceptual optimum because each step from a 
local conceptual optimum produces a dramatic increase in mistakes. See ANP, 173 .
tion, because this explains how we originated in an environment in which we 
had to orient ourselves. When the antirealist keeps repeating that a successful 
scientific theory doesn’t need to be “true,” he can only point to a small collec­
tion of computational models in the exact sciences that are used provisionally. 
He forgets that there simply is no purely instrumental1^  cause of World War 
II; that there is no ancestor of man that is purely “instrumentally” an ancestor; 
or that the trajectory of the moon is not simply an instrumentalistic notion to 
predict its position in the sky.
O f course, realism does not imply that all theories that we entertain at the 
moment are approximately true. Mistakes are as much a part of science as 
they are of everyday life. But mistakes can only be mistakes when they are not 
intended to be so. A purely instrumentalistic research program that refuses to 
commit itself to a particular model is only a sign of despair. Sooner or later its 
postulated entities will have to prove their existence or not. This is also the 
reason that Ruse’s “metaphysical scepticism” is not a real option for science in 
the long run. O f course, a doubter in science may nurse such scepticism as a 
legitimization of his uncertainty at a particular moment. But sooner or later 
someone will arise who will ask himself the question why a particular model 
worked or not and will try to penetrate the causal mechanism involved.
The message of all this is that there is no difference between a knowledge- 
claim and a reality-claim. As Sellars has taught us, knowledge is a disclosure of 
characteristics of the real world. Science is the enterprise of enlarging the 
scope of our knowledge by enlarging the scope of our ordinary sensory equip­
ment. There is therefore no way in which the results of science as a whole can 
be treated as a “just-so story” about the world. The discovery of Reality is the 
aim of science, and Sellars’s epistemology can help us not to expect too much 
(literal presence) but also not too little (purely instrumentalistic use) from its 
endeavors.
4 . T H E  F A I L U R E  OF P H Y S IC A L IS M  A N D  S E L L A R S ’S
R E F O R M E D  M A T E R IA L IS M
Another key problem of modern naturalism is the extent to which it should be 
purely physicalistic. Often naturalism is defined in such a way that it is taken 
to be identical to physicalism, which is the belief that ultimately only the laws 
of physics refer to real entities. Both Quine and Churchland, for example, are 
playing with the idea that only a couple of physical entities or variables are real 
“natural kinds” (see, for example, the latter’s ANP, 295). In principle, how­
ever, naturalism could be combined with an epistemological pluralism in
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which many different forms of knowledge and many different scientific disci­
plines “disclose” characteristics of things .^ 0 Many sciences can be interpreted 
as studying properties of objects whose constituents we can’t see. And outside 
the realm of science, we still have experience of the world and of our place in 
it, and this experience is a form of knowledge too.
The context in which Sellars discussed these problems was different from 
the current debates in the sense that it was still largely a theoretical debate in 
metaphysics about the status of materialism. In several discussions relating to 
vitalism, however, he argues for the autonomy of biology (see EN, 32off., PPPP, 
27off.)> Originally, Sellars concentrated on the question whether naturalism 
implied materialism or not. His answer was negative. In an article written in 
1927 he enumerates five characteristics of traditional materialism—(1) physical 
realism, (2) mechanism, (3) epiphenomenalism, (4) denial of the significance of 
values and ideals, (5) stress on stuff rather than on organization—and he con­
cludes that naturalism shares only the first characteristic with materialism and 
this one only if we don’t equate physical realism with physicalism. He concludes 
that “the truth of materialism was in its naturalism more than in its oversimpli­
fied ontology.” At the same time, however, he confesses that he wouldn’t resist 
the label ‘materialist* if materialism were to be defined in a new way*
It is exactly this that Sellars tried to do himself during the ‘30s and ‘40s 
when he often wrote about the need for a “reformed materialism.” Epistemo- 
logically, this reformed materialism was based on a distinction between “exter­
nal” nonparticipative knowledge—often referring to abstract, mathematical 
relations between objects—and the “participative knowledge” in which we see 
the natural processes in our minds “from the inside.” (Roughly this distinction 
corresponds to the distinction between explanation, with reference to natural 
laws, and understanding, in which we use our own experience to understand 
the experiences of other creatures.)
The idea is that participative knowledge has been neglected by traditional 
materialism and has been unjustly reified by idealism and panpsychism. A 
reformed materialism is needed to do justice to the fact that material entities 
not only have “external” causal relations, but often are so organized that their 
structure has an “immanent” or “emergent” internal causal structure as well. 
We have exclusive access to such a process in our own thinking, in which we 
“are on the inside of the brain and its focal level of operation” (EN, 313).
It is here, again, that Sellars’s evolutionary naturalism comes into play. In 
the book with this title (EN) he develops the ideas about emergence that he 
later will call “evolutionary materialism” (RAPW, 64). His message is that
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“organization is objectively significant and causally effective” and that “func­
tion and structure go together at every level” (EN, 334). Evolution is defined 
as “the active rise of new wholes with new properties” (EN, 334)* “Evolution 
means that there are levels in nature, that the higher is an outgrowth of the 
lower, that A and B integrated are more than A and B separate” (EN, 329).
Although Sellars makes a very clear distinction between his evolutionary 
materialism and that of, for example, Samuel Alexander and Lloyd Morgan, it 
is a pity that in his earlier work he does not refer more clearly to natural 
selection as the force that continually preserves integrated units and weeds out 
less well integrated units. Only as a result of this force do new “wholes” arise 
again and again* and the formulation in which Sellars speaks about the “active 
rise” of new wholes is at least misleading. In his later work it becomes clear, 
however, that his whole approach is compatible with modern gene theory, 
according to which “genes act as codes or patterns which can be reproduced" 
and “which embody possibilities of organization” that can be advantageous or
not (PPPP, 272, 274).
Already in his early writings Sellars rejected Bergson’s élan vital In 1909 
he visited Bergson and defended in discussion with him a nonvitalistic, com­
pletely materialistic philosophy. The lack of a more precise account about the 
levels in nature might be reason for confusing Sellars’s evolutionary natural­
ism with Lloyd Morgan’s “emergent evolution.” Such a confusion would be 
unfair, however, because Sellars means by his “wholes” nothing more than the 
compositions of parts, as, for example, is clear from his discussions about the 
origin of life (EN, PPPP). 1^
It is only as a result of recent discussions in evolutionary biology that we are 
now able to speak more clearly about levels in nature. On what level do we have 
reason to expect integrated units, for example? To answer this question we 
have to decide which entities natural selection works on: groups, individuals, 
families, or genes?32 Clearly, the discussion about the “levels of selection” which 
resulted in sociobiology is of special relevance here. Since the publication in
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3‘ “After I had adopted the term ‘emergence’ as an effective label, I still wished to keep from it 
any mystical connotation. To me it meant simply the fact that novel organization involved novel 
properties. Such properties should not be considered to be stuck on externally and miraculously, 
but to be functions o f the organization. It was, after all, just the conviction that structure and 
function are internally related” (PER, 203). Churchland recognizes two senses in which the 
expression “emergent properties” is used (ANP, 51): one which he identifies with “network 
properties” and one which he often encounters in philosophical contexts and rejects. At least 
Sellars cannot be accused o f  identifying emergent properties with anything other than network 
properties. But whether this implies that emergent properties are reducible, as Churchland claims, 
depends on one’s notion o f  reduction.
sa See, for example, E. Sober, “Holism, Individualism and the Units of Selection,” in E. Sober, 
ed., Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1984).
1963 of Wynne-Edwards’s Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behaviour, it is no 
longer self-evident that individuals are the only possible examples of integrated 
units in nature. After the many reactions to the work of Wynne-Edwards^ it has 
also become clear, however, that individuals are relatively the most stable inte­
grated units that are continually chiseled out and polished by natural selection, 
“Outlaw genes” that threaten the fitness of the individual will go extinct with the 
maladaptive individuals they help to create. Groups which demand a high 
degree of selflessness from their individual members seem to be mostly a prod­
uct of special kinship relations (hymenoptera, termites) or of strong reciprocal 
relations, indicating that selection by complete group extinction probably is a 
weaker force in evolution than selection as a result of differential reproduction 
of individuals within groups. At the same time, it has become increasingly clear, 
however, that individuals are essentially transitory units that have to dissolve as 
a result of sex and death each generation, because they are the product of genes 
and genes are selected for their ability to promote their own immortality, not 
that of their temporary vehicles.34
In Sellars’s day the most a philosopher could achieve in this respect was still 
rather vague. We can better understand now why individuals are in fact the 
most common example of integrated units, but we recognize at the same time 
that in principle groups or other aggregations could also have “emergent” 
characteristics. Because we realize that it is natural selection that sifts and saves 
the “holistic properties” of organisms, and tests and refines them, we can 
overcome the gap between holism and reductionism. Those “holistic proper­
ties” are coded in DNA and can only be selected when coded in this inheritable 
form (PPPP, 272).
5 . T H E  D O U B L E  K N O W L E D G E  T H E O R Y  O F  T H E  B R A I N - M I N D
Finally, a word about Sellars’s philosophy of mind, which is really a product of 
his reformed materialism. As a materialist, he of course maintained what he 
called the “essential identity of the brain-mind” (NA, 376). As a reformed 
materialist, however, he recognized the fact of our double knowledge about it. 
On the one hand we can know the brain in the external way that we know most 
physical objects; on the other hand we possess participative knowledge of its 
workings. In  Sellars’s own words: “Consciousness is a qualitative isolate in which 
we participate in our functioning. Here alone are we on the inside of nature” 
(PER, 148)* Consciousness is therefore also effective, a causal force. If  it were 
simply a passive spectator-like ability or an epiphenomenon, it wouldn’t have
as See, e.g., G. C. Williams, Adaptation and Natural Selection: A Critique o f Some Current Evolution­
ary Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).
34 See R. Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).
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evolved. In this context Sellars cites James’s argument (which goes back to 
Darwin): “If  pleasures and pains have no efficacy, one does not see . . .  why 
the most noxious acts, such as burning, might not give thrills of delight, and 
the most necessary ones, such as breathing, cause agony” (Principles of Psychol­
ogy* 1: 43» cited in “An Important Antinomy” [1908], NA, 36). Apparently 
consciousness is the way in which nature has enabled us to make biologically 
“wise” decisions.
On the human level consciousness clearly represents a new form of causal­
ity, which Sellars calls “agential causality” or “rational causality,” “that is, a 
causality guided by becauses” (NA, 372). Sellars also sees here the solution for 
the age-old debate about determinism and free will. Obviously, the notion of 
levels in nature also demands an idea about “higher” forms of causality which 
emerge as a result of new levels of complexity and integration. Human free­
dom needs therefore not to be understood as a kind of “counter-causal activ­
ity” (NA, 37), but as representing a high level of causality, in which an organ­
ism is able to devise models of different, more and less desirable futures. Such 
a creature can continually weigh different alternatives and can continually 
correct and optimalize its course in relation to a series of internal goals. Free­
dom is not opposed to causal determinism, but is opposed to a fatalism and 
belief in predestination that ignores our ability to control our own destiny to 
the extent that we “participate in our functioning.”
Therefore, on the one hand, human behavior cannot be understood on 
purely mechanistic principles. As Sellars says: “The behavior of man cannot 
be described in terms of mechanics. It is absurd and unempirical to ignore 
the fact that his behavior involves the application of past experience to the 
situation which now confronts him. And this situation is inseparable from his 
interests and selections” (EN, 273). On the other hand, however, is it not 
completely impossible to predict the behavior of a fellow human being. “[I]f 
I could know exactly what the situation was which confronted an individual, 
what his valuations and desires were, what his courage was, etc., I could 
foretell his conduct. Assuredly the general line of it. Why? Because these are 
the actual data of his own decision. As soon as these become stable in delib­
eration, the choice is fixed” (EN, 275). Of course, the kind of knowledge that 
we use to predict our fellow human beings is completely different from 
physicalistic external knowledge. We are to some extent able to predict 
the behavior of fellow human beings, because we ourselves are biological 
decision-centers, evaluating the situations we encounter on the basis of past 
experiences and relating them to desirable goals. We ourselves are biological 
“selves” in which multiple desires are integrated and transformed into practi­
cable plans.
O f course, without such a self, human behavior would lose the goal-
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directed character that makes it so completely different from the Brownian 
movements of particles. Agential causality, according to Sellars, is based on 
the biological necessity of a unified response, which requires dominance, inte­
gration, and inhibition among the different inclinations (NA, 377). The “self' 
is simply the “focus” of this activity of unifying impulses and guiding behavior. 
It is constituted by “a background of achievement and growth that we call 
character, accepted rules, working knowledge, and so on” (NA, 379). “ ‘Free 
will* is, accordingly, to be conceived as choice and decision, in which the self 
acts as a focus and locus of the biological need for viable action, in a context in 
which reflexes and habits are not enough” (NA, 381).
In what respect are these analyses interesting for modern versions of natu­
ralism? Modern naturalists, for example Paul Churchland, have made much 
fuss about the status of what they call “folk psychology,” “a theory that enables 
us to predict and explain the behavior of humans that surround us” (ANP, xi). 
In this respect they seem to take Feyerabend’s side in the debate between 
Wilfrid Sellars and Feyerabend on the status of the “manifest image”: Wilfrid 
Sellars protested against Feyerabend’s idea that the manifest image constituted 
an, in principle, replaceable theory.35 Paul Churchland follows in Feyerabend’s 
footsteps and even thinks that he has found the theory that in the end will 
replace “folk psychology”: a sophisticated connectionist neuroscience.
An important implication of Roy Wood Sellars’s view about agential causal­
ity is that folk psychology probably cannot be completely replaced by a more 
scientific psychology, because the categories which we use to express and 
understand our behavior are also the categories which structure and deter­
mine our behavior. The level on which we experience our behavior is also the 
level on which it is caused, and probably the way in which we experience 
ourselves is not purely a product of culture, contrary to the suggestion of both 
Feyerabend and Churchland. 36
If Sellars is right that our consciousness is a “natural isolate,” in which we 
are “on the inside of nature” and in which we “participate in our functioning” 
(PER, 148), then purely external, physicalistic knowledge about our brain- 
minds will not be sufficient to understand and predict our behavior. To under­
stand a fellow human being, we will have to apply the same valuations and 
weigh the same desires as she has and we will have to see the situations in 
which she made her decision from her perspective. External knowledge has 
too limited a scope and cannot deal with the effectiveness of the complicated
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structures which determine behavior. To understand other human beings and 
intelligent animals, we therefore have to use our ability to simulate the way 
they will probably represent their situation on the private ‘"dashboard” of their 
consciousness on the basis of our own consciousness. And probably our “dash­
board” has evolved to represent the variables which are relevant for decisions 
that have consequences for survival.**?
This means that our understanding of animals and humans differs from 
our understanding of a physical system. It is no coincidence that the laws of 
physics are mainly abstractions derived from very simple situations in laborato­
ries, in which only two or three variables are allowed to change and all other 
variables are artificially kept constant. Of course, no one would want to claim 
that the laws o f physics are infringed outside the laboratory, but whether they 
are sufficient to understand and predict more complicated systems is a ques­
tion. Already in the laboratories of the chemist we can see how the structure of 
a material can determine its properties to such a degree that the laws of 
physics are no longer sufficient to understand them. Organic substances like 
DNA can function like complicated instructions and are thus able to “impose 
their own story” upon their surroundings.
Those “stories” are not based on a transgression of the laws of physics; 
rather they simply assume them, like the artist who, according to Nietzsche, is 
able to dance in chains. To predict the behavior of such “pattern-driven” 
entities the laws of physics are simply insufficient; we need to disentangle the 
patterns or stories that really determine their behavior. In the same way 
human behavior might be directed by a series of causes which really have the 
character of “becauses” and the only way to predict human behavior could 
well be the internal simulation of these “becauses.” Probably we have evolved a 
natural talent for this hermeneutical task which is so important for a social 
animal, s8
This would mean that “participative knowledge” is essentially not reduc­
ible and that our evolved ability to have such knowledge can probably no t be 
very easily improved. “Folk psychology” can therefore have its own legitimacy 
and independency. “Reasons” or “becauses” would constitute real causal 
forces and it would therefore not make much sense to call only physical 
entities “natural kinds,” as Churchland does. At the same time this would 
mean, however, that we are forced to accept an epistemological pluralism in 
which concepts of different sciences can in principle all have objective re fe r­
ence. They simply refer to different levels of organization and integration in
t
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which the “higher levels” are not independent of lower levels, but nevertheless 
represent their own causal or functional “logic” and “simplicity,”^
It is very tem pting (and hubristic) to give an answer in this spirit to die 
critical remarks made by Wilfrid Sellars on the philosophy of mind of his 
fa thers0 Wilfrid Sellars refers to passages in his father’s writings in which he 
denies that physical and neurophysiological ("external”) science can throw 
much light on the qualitative dimension of consciousness, Sellars fils proposes 
that, in principle, a “sufficiently subtle theory of neurophysiological structure” 
should be able to localize the physical basis of those qualitative characteristics 
(without concluding that the internal description can be completely elimi­
nated). Probably he is right; probably his father was indeed somewhat too 
pessimistic about the future possiblities of neuroscience.
On the other hand, his father might have been right in his scepticism 
towards the completeness of neurophysiology. That is, it could still be true 
that even a complete knowledge of the specific neurophysiological set-up 
required for a particular frame of mind would only produce a third-person 
account of it. And the only way actually to know what a particular frame of 
mind is and how it produces the behavior that is typical of that frame of mind 
is to have direct access to a first-person account of it, which you can’t get from 
the “outside” {contra ANP, 75). If  Sellars p m  is right the best way to predict the 
behavior o f humans is by way of “empathetic understanding,” because the way 
in which a situation is judged from the perspective of a particular brain-state 
probably can never be reconstructed from a detailed knowledge of each of its 
synaptic weights but only from a more holistic overview of them and of their 
interaction with the environment—a view which is uniquely offered from the 
inside of the brain, on the “dashboard” of self-consciousness.^ 1
6 . W H A T ,  T H E N ,  IS  N A T U R A L I S M ?
Naturalism, as the position that sees philosophy as no longer “an a priori 
propaedeutic or groundwork for science, but as continuous with science,”42
39 According to Michael Ruse, for example, biology “has its own simplicity” (“The Last Word 
on Teleology,” in Is Science Sexist? [Dordrecht, 1981]). The suggestion that is developed here in 
the spirit o f  Roy Wood Sellars is that a kind of “higher-order simplicity’1 could give us access via 
our own mental states to our own behavior.
4°W. Sellars, “The Doubie-Knowledge Approach to the Mind-Body Problem,” 286ff.
For an interesting review which covers the transition from Roy Wood Sellars to modern 
philosophy o f mind and shows how all modern positions can be seen as radicalizations of aspects 
of his original position, see C. F. Delaney, “Sellars and the Contemporary Mind-Body Problem,” 
 ^New Scholasticism 45 (19 71): 245- 68, I have tried to draw the contours o f a “dashboard theory of 
consciousness” based on Sellars and criticizing Churchland in “Innate Structures of Experience, 
Intentions and Symbols,” Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 84 (1992): 6 , 128—37 .
4*W. V. Quine, “Natural Kinds/* in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Colum­
bia University Press, 1969).
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has long been embarrassed by conflicting sympathies. On the one hand, it has 
a high regard for science; and physics is still often regarded as the ultimate 
example of what a science should be: exact, solid, testable, falsifiable, or what­
ever. On the other hand, naturalism can be seen as a (to some extent “common 
sense”) reaction against all those philosophies that have tended to isolate man 
from the rest o f nature and neglected the more down-to-earth aspects of 
human life. It is this latter form of naturalism that has been reinforced by the 
Darwinian explanation of our own origins.
According to Sellars it is “the fundamental thesis of naturalism” that man is 
“a part of nature” (EN, 278). From this follows the fact that the natural 
sciences should also apply to man. However, it does not follow that physics has 
a monopoly on causal explanations—only that there is no special realm in 
which the laws of physics are transcended and that all causes (even “becauses” 
or reasons) are natural causes.
The attempt to identify naturalism with physicalism can ultimately be seen 
as the result of a nostalgia towards a foundational kind of philosophy in which 
all reality can be deduced from a simple set of primary truths. If we are a part 
of reality, however, it is the question whether we are able to take up an 
external vantage point from which we can oversee all reality. If we are a part 
of reality and knowledge is “only” our way of orientation, it is no longer 
necessary to assume that knowledge could even in principle ever be “com­
plete,” because knowledge is thoroughly perspectival and semeiotic.
In Sellars’s words: knowledge should never claim to be being (EN, 37 ). It is 
essentially abbreviation, representation in another medium, in which it should 
simplify to enable decisions. Recently, connectionist models of mind have 
clarified the way in which large amounts of information can be stored in 
simplified “prototypes” which are the result of a gradual modification o f  
synaptic weights until they are able to make particular distinctions (ANP). I f  
this model is correct, it seems to me that there is no longer reason to assume 
that one class of prototypes has a superior value in structuring reality.43 In  
principle all prototypes that help us make sense of our world could be valid.
When we combine this epistemological pluralism with realism and with the  
idea of emergence, we are very close to the naturalism of Sellars, which to  
some extent is more radical than it seems at first sight. Realism, even “depth  
realism” (Collier), is a necessary assumption if the notion of man being part o f  
nature is to make any sense. The idea that the burden of proof is on the realist
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43 Elsewhere, I have argued that Churchland’s neurocomputational relativism is in conflict 
with this physicalism. I proposed an “epistemological pluralism” (“Innate Structures of E x p e r i­
ence, Intentions and Symbols”) and afterwards was reassured by reading Stump’s article o n  
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arises from a foundationalistic philosophy which assumes that we can start 
from scratch (or from sense-data). It would be fairer, however, simply to 
compare the explanatory power of a realist framework with that of an anti- 
realistic alternative, if such an alternative really exists, if it is not simply an 
exhibition of philosophical acrobatics. The instrumentalist always lags behind, 
because he still doesn’t have an answer to the question of why our theories are 
sometimes so successful.
Emergent properties must be assumed in order to understand why evolu­
tion works. Natural selection has to test something; and what it tests are 
emergent properties insofar as they can be encoded in.genes. It is a pity that 
Sellars did not clearly formulate this link between selection and emergence 
(see, however, PPPP, 272), but he nevertheless clearly did see that evolution 
demands a completely materialistic notion of emergent properties.
At the same time Sellars was one of the few twentieth-century philosophers 
who realized that the clue to an adequate naturalism lies not so much in an 
orientation to physics as in an orientation to evolutionary biology. The roots of 
naturalism lie more in the Darwinian view that we are products of nature than 
in the Newtonian view that nature is governed by inflexible laws.44
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